Uncertainty has qualitatively different implications than risk in studying executive incentives. We study the interplay between pro tability uncertainty and moral hazard, where pro tability is multiplicative with the managerial effort. Investors who face greater uncertainty desire faster learning, and consequently offer higher managerial incentives to induce higher effort from the manager. In contrast to the standard negative risk-incentive tradeoff, this "learning-by-doing" effect generates a positive relation between pro tability uncertainty and incentives. We document strong empirical support for this prediction.
Introduction
A central prediction of the principal-agent theory is the negative trade-off between risk and incentives (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987) . Higher performance pay induces greater effort from the agent but increases the risk on his compensation, which in turn raises risk compensation in the wage cost. The greater the output risk, the higher the risk compensation, leading to a lower performance pay to the risk-averse agent in the optimal contract. Yet, numerous studies over the past two decades nd mixed empirical evidence on such a negative relation between risk and incentives. 1 It is important to acknowledge that the empirically measured risk, which is essentially performance variance, can come from either the cash ow risk or the project's pro tability uncertainty. More specically, in many types of economic environment with agency relationships, current output not only consists of the manager's effort and some transitory random noise (i.e., the cash ow risk), but more importantly, the unobserved long-run pro tability of the project (i.e., pro tability uncertainty, or simply uncertainty).
However, little attention has been paid to uncertainty in the principal-agent literature, although uncertainty has been shown to be important in explaining many phenomena in various markets (e.g., Pastor and Veronesi (2003) ). 2 In this paper, we examine how the endogenous learning on the rm's pro tability uncertainty impacts executive incentives when investors seek for signals to improve the rm's future investment decision. In contrast to the negative risk-incentive relation generated by standard agency theories, in a wide parameter range, our model predicts a positive relation between the degree of pro tability uncertainty and incentives.
This positive uncertainty-incentive relation is strongly supported by our empirical analysis. Moreover, our ndings imply that it is important to distinguish cash ow risk from pro tability uncertainty in studying executive incentives, and suggest that the previous mixed empirical results in testing the negative riskincentive trade-off may be attributable to the positive bias caused by omitting variables that are proxies for pro tability uncertainty.
Our model is cast in a two-period investment setting with moral hazard in the rst period. At period 1 the rm hires a manager to provide managerial labor, and the project generates an output of y 1 = (K 1 + L 1 ) + 1 , where K 1 is the capital, L 1 is the the manager's labor (effort) input, and 1 is the exogenous cash ow shock.
Motivated by the neoclassical investment literature, the parameter is the project's marginal productivity, or the project's pro tability. The pro tability is unknown, and investors need better information on to guide future investment decisions. The key of the model is that, thanks to the AK technology where the labor is multiplicative with , a higher labor input can increase the information-to-noise ratio when investors learn the project's pro tability from the output signal y 1 using Bayes' rule.
At period 2, the rm with the same technology adjusts capital K 2 through investment, and resets the labor input L 2 . Therefore, to optimize over the period-2 investment, investors desire faster learning (i.e., they prefer to reduce the posterior variance of ) from the rst-period output signal y 1 . Because the information content of the output increases with managerial effort in the rst period, investors would like to offer a high powered contract to induce higher effort so as to learn more about the unobservable pro tability . Moreover, the higher the degree of pro tability uncertainty, the greater the reduction of the posterior variance of , and therefore the greater the bene t in inducing a higher period 1 effort.
Under this channel, rms with uncertain long-run pro tability are offering high-power incentives to their managers for more informative signals in guiding their investment policies, which could lead to a positive uncertainty-incentive relation. 3 Our mechanism is similar in spirit to the learning-by-doing literature (e.g., Jovanovic and Lach (1989) , Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996) , and Johnson (2007) ). 4 We empirically test the positive uncertainty-incentive relation in Section 3. Following Pastor and Veronesi (2003) and Korteweg and Polson (2009) we use rm age as our rst proxy, with older rms indicating lower uncertainty. We also follow Pastor et al. (2009) and use the stock price reaction to earnings announcements (i.e., earnings response coef cient or ERC) as another proxy for pro tability uncertainty. Intuitively, investors who are more uncertain about the pro tability of a company should be more responsive to earnings surprises. Our other proxies for pro tability uncertainty are market-tobook, tangibility, and analyst forecast error. A higher market-to-book ratio or a lower tangibility ratio indicates greater pro tability uncertainty (Korteweg and Polson (2009) ). Analyst forecast errors are used in the literature to proxy for uncertainty about future earnings (e.g., Lang and Lundholm (1996) ). We then measure incentives using pay performance sensitivities (PPS henceforth) and run panel regressions of PPS on pro tability uncertainty proxies, controlling for the factors known to affect PPS. Consistent with our model prediction, we nd that rm age and tangibility are negatively related to the incentive variable PPS; and ERC, market-to-book ratio, and analyst forecast error are positively related to PPS. Although each individual proxy for uncertainty may not be perfect, the consistent results obtained from all the ve proxies seem to support our theoretical prediction of a positive uncertainty-incentive relation.
Our paper provides the rst systematic empirical analysis of the effects of pro tability uncertainty on CEO incentives. 5 We nd support to our theoretical prediction that uncertainty has a positive impact on incentives. More importantly, in the view of our paper, once acknowledging that the risk measures proposed by the previous literature may well be contaminated by pro tability uncertainty, it is not surprising that the empirical evidence for negative risk-incentive trade-off has been mixed. For instance, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999 , 2002 nd that the rank of dollar return volatility is negatively associated with pay performance sensitivities. 6 Becker (2006) , Bushman et al. (1996), and Yermack (1995) , however, do not nd any signi cant impact of percentage stock return volatility on incentives, and Core and Guay (1999) obtain a positive effect of idiosyncratic risk on incentives. 7 We argue that it is important to include pro tability uncertainty variables in empirical speci cations. Indeed, we nd evidence that controlling 5 Although some studies have examined the relation between incentives and the market-to-book ratio, and that between incentives and tangibility (Bizjak, et al., 1993; Core and Guay, 1999; Himmelberg, et al., 1999; Coles, et al., 2006) , these studies are not in the context of the relation between uncertainty and incentives. We are not aware of any study that speci cally examines the relation between incentives and ERC, analyst forecast error, and rm age.
6 Garvey and Milbourn (2003) and Jin (2002) con rm this negative relation, and further nd that the rank of idiosyncratic dollar return volatility is negatively related to incentives while rm systematic risk is not signi cantly related to incentives. Core, et al. (2003) and Lambert and Larcker (1987) nd that the relative weight on stock price performance measures in CEO pay is a decreasing function of the stock return variance. Bitler et al. (2005) measure rm risk as the absolute value of the residual of the pro t to equity ratio regressed on various rm and managerial characteristics, and nd that entrepreneurial ownership shares decrease with rm risk. Himmelberg et al. (1999) show that idiosyncratic risk (measured using percentage return variance) is negatively related to managerial equity ownership. 7 Other papers in this camp include Garen (1994) , who nds that neither systematic risk nor idiosyncratic risk has any signicant effect on incentives, and Conyon and Murphy (2000) , who show that the relation between risk and incentives is insigni cant or positive, depending on the empirical approach used. In addition, Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles (1993) nd no relation between incentives and rm risk. Coles, Daniel and Naveen (JFE, 2006) nd that the relation between incentives and rm risk varies in the form of the regression speci cation. Prendergast (2002) also reviews some mixed evidence for risk-incentive relationship in the areas other than executive compensation.
for uncertainties help partially (if not fully) restore the negative risk-incentive relation predicted by the standard agency theories. In our empirical analysis, without including pro tability uncertainty variables, the regression coef cient on return volatility, a risk measure, is often insigni cant or positive. Once we include pro tability uncertainty proxies, the coef cient on stock return volatility generally becomes negative or less positive.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and its prediction of the positive relation between pro tability uncertainty and incentives. Section 3 conducts empirical analysis and Section 4 concludes the paper. All proofs are in the Appendix.
The Model

The Setting
We consider a two-period investment model, where the investment consists of capital and (managerial) labor inputs. Investors are risk neutral, and managers are risk averse with CARA preference. We will interpret labor input as the manager's effort. For simplicity, we will assume that moral hazard only exists in the rst period, but the rm matures in the second period and therefore is no longer subject to agency issues. Without loss of generality, the risk-free rate is set to zero.
The output in each period, before the investment cost, is modeled as (similar to the AK technology in the investment literature)
where K t is the capital level at period t, L t is the managerial labor input at period t, and t N 0; 2 is the i.i.d. normally distributed random noises. Importantly, , which can be interpreted as the project's pro tability or marginal productivity, is uncertain. Neither the rm nor the manager can observe the pro tability directly, and they will learn along the equilibrium path. At time 0 the common prior about the pro tability is 8
The multiplicative speci cation and managerial labor input L in the AK technology is important in driving the positive uncertainty-incentive relationship due to the learning-by-doing effect. However, it is worth pointing out that the positive relationship may well arise under an additive speci cation (e.g., DeMarzo and Sannikov (2008) ). We use the multiplicative framework in the present paper to illustrate the role of learning-by-doing effect (i.e., implementing a higher effort can reduce the posterior variance of the unknown pro tability parameter ).
At the beginning of period 1, the rm faces a binary decision of whether to make the investment or not, and if investment occurs, the lump sum investment K 1 is normalized to 1. Investors will only make the initial investment if their total expected value from this project exceeds their outside option, which is normalized to zero. Hence, ( 0 ; 0 ) must be suf ciently favorable for the project to be adopted.
Given the capital level K 1 , investors hire a manager to provide labor input L 1 . Unfortunately, the labor input L 1 (which can be interpreted as managerial effort) is unobservable, therefore due to moral hazard issues investors offer the manager a compensation contract for proper incentives. For simplicity, we focus on the space of linear contracts, where the wage contract w 1 takes the following form:
Here, is the xed salary, and is the incentive. The monetary cost for the manager's labor
where l > 0 is a positive constant. Therefore, the manager's utility by accepting the contract w 1 (y; ; ) and working L 1 is given by
where a > 0 is the manager's risk-aversion coef cient. We will study the manager's effort choice given the contract w 1 , which is summarized by ( ; ). Finally, the manager has a reservation utility of b U at time 0, which is normalized to 1 without loss of generality.
Suppose that the rm induces a labor input of L 1 from the period 1 manager. At the second period the rm makes capital investment and labor investment based on the updated posterior of project pro tability 1 . For period-2 labor investment L 2 , we simply assume that they hire another manager with the same cost function l 2 L 2 2 , and for simplicity, we assume away any agency problem at period 2 (as the rm's operation becomes more like a routine). 9 For capital investment, given initial capital level 1, an investment of I leads 9 The assumption of no agency issue in the second period is innocuous and for convenience only. As long as the period 2 managerial labor input has impact on the learning of pro tability of period 3, period 2 incentives (if moral hazard problem to a new capital level of 1 + I, but incurs a quadratic adjustment cost of I + k 2 I 2 , where k > 0 is a positive constant. As a result, investors at the beginning of period 2 will solve the following problem:
In summary, the timeline of the model is as follows, as shown in Figure 1 . We solve the model backward in the following sections.
1. At the beginning of t = 1 the rm is deciding whether to take a project with capital normalized to 1. Its outside option is normalized to zero.
2. If the rm decides to take this project, investors hire one manager and offers him a linear contract w 1 = + y 1 , where y 1 = (1 + L 1 ) + 1 is the project's output at period 1. Therefore the investors' payoff at period 1 is given by
3. Given the outcome y 1 , investors update their belief about based on the prior N ( 0 ; 0 ).
still persists) will share the same qualitative feature as period 1 incentives. The important assumption is that the old period 1 manager is replaced by another new manager in period 2, so that the incentive contract is short-term. With long-term employment relationship and endogenous learning, the manager can enjoy some endogenous information rent (as the manager who shirks at period 1 knows that the project actually is better than what investors believe), which makes analysis complicated. See He, Yu, and Wei (2010) for details.
4. At t = 2, the rm can make the capital investment I and labor investment L 2 , so that y 2 =
(1 + I + L 2 ) + 2 . The second period payoff is
Learning and Investing in Period 2
Immediately after observing y 1 at period 1, investors update their belief about . Given the optimal labor input L 1 implemented by the incentive contract at period 1, Bayes' rule implies that the posterior of the project's pro tability is characterized by the posterior mean and posterior variance:
Intuitively, y 1 0 (1 + L 1 ) represents an unexpected shock from the output. Then if investors observes a positive unexpected shock y 1 0 (1 + L 1 ) > 0, which serves a positive signal to the project pro tability , then as in Eq. (3) they should update the long-term pro tability 1 upwards.
As we will see shortly, given the period 1 output information, the pro tability estimate 1 guides the rm's investment decision at period 2. The posterior variance 1 in Eq. (4), which measures the precision of pro tability estimate 1 , directly determines the investment ef ciency at period 2. Moreover, it is important to stress that the posterior variance 1 negatively depends on L 1 , thanks to the multiplicative structure in Eq. (1). Otherwise, a greater investment in K 1 or L 1 has no impact on the informativeness of the signal y 1 in learning the pro tability .
At period 2 the rm makes capital investment and labor investment to solve the following problem:
where we have expressed the investors' period 2 value V 2 ( 1 ) as a function of the period 1 posterior mean 1 . For instance, had the investors perfectly known , they would have chosen the investment level Due to imperfect information, the optimal investment I = 1 1 k deviates from the optimal level 1 k in the full-information setting, and the difference has a variance of 1 =k 2 .
Standing at time 0, the time-0 expected payoff from period 2 is given by
In other words, investors' expected value in period 2 is decreasing in 1 , i.e., the posterior variance of the unobserved pro tability . Intuitively, the lower the posterior variance 1 , the more precise the estimate of the pro tability , and the more ef cient the second period investment. Moreover, from Eq. (4), 1 decreases with effort L 1 . This important observation implies that, when raising the incentive in the rst period, there is more information content in period 1 output y 1 , and hence investors learn more about the unobservable pro tability . As we will elaborate on in the next section, this learning-by-doing mechanism is the key in driving our result.
Optimal Contracting in Period 1
We now solve the model backward for Stages 2 and 1. At Stage 2, i.e., after the rm decides to take the project and hires a manager, we solve for the optimal linear contract, and in turn the rm's value from this project. Then at Stage 1, the rm will take the project if and only if this value exceeds 0.
At Stage 2, investors offer a linear contract w 1 = + y 1 to implement the optimal labor (effort) L 1 , and the optimal contract maximizes their expected total value (including both periods' cash ows):
subject to the manager's incentive compatibility and the participation constraints:
; and
The following lemma gives the manager's optimal labor (effort) choice in response to the incentive contract summarized by ( ; ):
Lemma 1 A contract w 1 = + y 1 implements labor L 1 and satis es the manager's participation constraint if and only if Essentially, Lemma 1 establishes an important link between the implemented labor L 1 and the incentive loadings in any incentive-compatible contracts, which allows the rm to choose implemented L 1 (in turn the contract parameters and ) to maximize its value function. In light of Lemma 1, we can replace the incentive compatibility and the participation constraints in the investors' problem by Eq. (7) and Eq. 
The rst term in the investors' value function is the expected rst period output, the second term is the labor cost, the third term is the manager's risk compensation, and the last term is the rm's period 2 continuation value. Once we derive the optimal effort level L 1 , the optimal contract (i.e., , and ) can be completely speci ed by Eq. (7) and Eq. (8).
Positive Incentive-Uncertainty Relation
In our model, learning could induce a positive relation between incentives and uncertainty. This result is rooted in the fact that investors' expected value of period 2 value, E 0 [V 2 ( 1 )], depends on learning about pro tability from period-1 output y 1 . As indicated by Eq. (5), maximizing E 0 [V 2 ( 1 )] is equivalent to minimizing the posterior variance of , i.e., 1 . Because L 1 is multiplicative with in the signal y 1 as in (1), implementing a higher effort L 1 raises the informativeness of the period 1 signal y 1 , or equivalently, reduces the posterior variance 1 . Essentially, this mechanism shares the similar spirit to the learning-bydoing literature (e.g., Jovanovic and Lach (1989) , Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996) , and Johnson (2007)). For example, Johnson (2007) shows that when there is uncertainty about rms' production function, rms tend to overinvest due to the desire to learn about the unknown production function.
Presumably, this learning-by-doing effect is stronger in a more uncertain environment (i.e., a larger 0 ). This is because starting with a larger 0 , the reduction of the posterior variance will be more signi cant, which results in a greater bene t of inducing a higher effort. That is, based on Eq. (4), we have
In Figure 2 , we plot 1 as a function of effort L 1 for different levels of 0 . As we can see, when 0 increases, the marginal bene t of raising effort L 1 becomes greater. To implement a higher effort, a greater incentive is needed, which results in a positive relation between uncertainty and incentives.
In Proposition 1 we formally prove the existence of such a positive uncertainty-incentive relation when the manager is suf ciently risk tolerant. Notice that high uncertainty also implies a greater incentive provision cost, since uncertainty raises the risk that the manager is bearing. This is the reason why we require the manager to be suf ciently risk tolerant.
Proposition 1 For suf ciently small risk aversion coef cient a, a positive relation exists between and 0 , i.e., In the top two panels, the model implied incentive is relatively high. When we raise the cash ow risk 2 , parameter uncertainty 0 , and absolute risk aversion a; the model-implied incentive can be reduced to a much more reasonable range as shown in the bottom two panels C and D. When we set a = 0:5; there is still a positive relation between uncertainty and incentives. However, the traditional tradeoff between risk and incentive is now hump shaped. The driving force for this hump shape risk-incentive relation is again the "learning-by-doing" effect. Notice that investors would like to reduce the posterior
and one can easily show that
In this case, the information-noise ratio is low and there is a lot of room for learning. In this situation, the marginal bene t of expediting learning (through raising labor input) is positively related to information-to-noise ratio. Hence, a greater 2
11 We have
lowers the marginal bene t
when raising labor input. On the other hand, when
we have
In this case, the information-to-noise ratio is suf ciently high and hence, we already learned a lot about the pro tability . As a result the marginal learning bene t by increasing effort is low. However, for a greater 2 ; the information-to-noise ratio is reduced. As a result, there is more room to learn, and consequently a higher marginal bene t from learning. Taken together, there is a potential positive relation between incentives and risk due to learning, and this learning effect might dominate the traditional negative risk-incentive trade-off. In sum, in contrast to the standard principal-agent setting, our model predicts a non-monotonic relation between risk and incentives.
In a nutshell, our multiplicative model not only predicts a positive relation between uncertainty and incentives for small risk aversion coef cients, but also suggests that there is not necessarily a clear-cut relationship between risk and incentives. Hence, our model provides another potential explanation why it is dif cult to identify a negative risk-incentive trade-off in the data. However, we by no means use our simple model to quantitatively match the (moments of) incentives observed in the data. Instead, we simply use it to highlight the idea that learning on unobservable pro tability can lead to a positive relation between uncertainty and incentives.
Empirical Analysis
In this section, we empirically test the prediction of a positive relation between uncertainty and incentives.
We also investigate how this positive relation affects the traditional trade-off between risk and incentives.
Below in Section 3.1, we describe our data, incentive and risk measures, and pro tability uncertainty proxies. We then provide regression results in Section 3.2.
Data, Variables, and Summary Statistics
Data and Sample Selection
Our sample consists of a manager-rm matched panel dataset from 1992 to 2008. This dataset allows us to track through time the highest paid executives in rms covered by ExecuComp. We merge the manager-level ExecuComp data with the rm-level annual accounting variables from Compustat, stock returns from CRSP, corporate board information from RiskMetrics, and analyst forecast information from IBES. We then remove the observations with incomplete data. We also winsorize the continuous variables that present obvious outliers, by replacing the extreme values with the 1% and 99% percentile values. Our full sample includes 2,441 rms and 25,999 top executives who have worked for these companies, and the main regressions are estimated based on this full sample.
Pay-Performance Sensitivity
The dependent variable in the paper is pay-performance sensitivity (PPS), a standard variable used in the literature to measure managerial incentives. The literature on executive compensation typically employs two measures of PPS. The rst measure, the dollar-to-dollar measure (PPS1), is equal to the dollar change in stock and option holdings for a one dollar change in rm value (see, e.g., Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) , Jin (2002) , Palia (2001), and Yermack (1995) ). 12 This measure is essentially @W ealth=@(M arket V alue) (where W ealth is the CEO's wealth) and is also called value-sensitivity or share of the money in Becker (2006) . Another measure, the dollar-to-percentage measure (PPS2), is equal to the dollar change in stock and option holdings for a one percent change in rm value (Core and Guay (2002)). The PPS2 measure is equal to @W ealth=@(Return) and is also referred to as return-sensitivity or money at stake in Becker (2006) . Baker and Hall (2004) mention that both PPS measures may be appropriate, depending on how CEO actions are assumed to affect rm value. When CEO actions primarily affect rm dollar returns and have constant dollar effects across rms of different sizes (such as perquisite consumption through the purchase of a corporate jet), the appropriate measure of CEO incentives is dollar-to-dollar. In contrast, when CEO actions have an impact proportional to rm size and thus primarily affect rm percentage returns (such as the implementation of rm strategy), the appropriate measure of CEO incentives is dollar-to-percentage. Baker and Hall (2004) estimate the marginal product of CEO effort and nd that neither polar case assumption is correct: the marginal product of CEO effort scales with rm size in varying degrees. They interpret the results as evidence that CEOs participate in a range of activities. As a result, similar to Becker (2006) and Core and Guay (1999), we use both measures of PPS in our empirical analysis.
The two PPS measures mentioned above are standard measures employed in the extant literature, which include Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) , Becker (2006) , Core and Guay (2002) , etc. In addition to these two direct measures of incentives, some empirical studies use a regression approach to obtain PPS. In this approach, executives' wealth is regressed on rm performance and other rm characteristic variables, and the coef cient on rm performance is interpreted as the pay-performance sensitivity (see e.g., Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) , Garvey and Milbourn (2003) , and Jensen and Murphy (1990) ). Differing from such regression technique that derives a single estimate of the average pay-performance link, the direct approach calculates PPS1 and PPS2 for each individual executive and obtains a distribution of incentives. We also replicate our empirical analysis using the PPS obtained from the regression approach and we achieve essentially the same results. 13
Empirical Proxies for Pro tability Uncertainty
The primary explanatory variables of interest in the paper are ve pro tability uncertainty variables. These variables have been used in the existing literature (Pastor and Veronesi, 2003; Korteweg and Polson, 2009) as proxies for pro tability uncertainty. Below we explain the ve proxies, and we also include the detailed de nitions of these variables in Appendix B. It is worth noting that the results of the paper should be interpreted with the following points in mind. First, the uncertainty proxies are not perfect; they could re ect rm characteristics other than pro tability uncertainty. It is, therefore, important to investigate an array of uncertainty variables commonly used in the literature and see whether all these variables give consistent results. Second, some of the uncertainty variables we use are positively correlated with rm volatility; others are negatively correlated with volatility. Examining all the different uncertainty variables will help us separate the role of uncertainty from that of volatility. Furthermore, we do not use rm size as an uncertainty proxy, although it is proposed by such literature as Korteweg and Polson (2009) . There exists a strong empirical relation between size and PPS; that is, rm size is negatively correlated with PPS1 and positively correlated with PPS2 (e.g., Edmans, et al., 2009) . The literature has proposed various explanations for this pattern, and therefore size may not be a clean pro tability uncertainty variable for our purpose. 14 We do, however, include rm size in all our regressions as a control variable to capture the 13 Using the regression approach, the coef cient of the cross term of rm performance and variable X can be interpreted as the marginal effect of X on PPS. We nd that the coef cients of the cross terms of rm performance and the uncertainty variables are consistent with our expectations. We also nd that the coef cient of the cross term of rm performance and volatility becomes generally negative when the uncertainty variables are captured.
14 For instance, in the Holmstrom and Milgrom's CARA-Normal framework, risk is measured in dollar returns. Then dollar-todollar PPS1 should be lower for larger rms with greater dollar variances in output. For the dollar-to-percentage PPS2 meaure, the matching model in Gabaix and Landier (2008) suggests that pay increases with rm size. Since part of compensation is in variable pay, it suggests that PPS2 is positively correlated with rm size. size effect. 15 Natural log of rm age The rst proxy that we employ is rm age. Previous studies such as Pastor and Veronesi (2003) and Korteweg and Polson (2009) use rm age as a proxy for pro tability uncertainty.
Uncertainty declines over a rm's lifetime due to learning, and younger rms have higher uncertainty.
Following Pastor and Veronesi (2003), we consider each rm as "born" in the year of its rst appearance in the CRSP database. Speci cally, we obtain the rst occurrence of a valid stock price on CRSP, as well as the rst occurrence of a valid market value in the CRSP/COMPUSTAT database, and take the earlier of the two. The rm's age is assigned the value of one in the year in which the rm is born and increases by one in each subsequent year. As in Pastor and Veronesi (2003), we take the natural log of rm age.
Log(age) is concave in rm's plain age, and this is to capture the idea that regarding uncertainty, one year of age should matter more for young rms than for old rms. 16 Earnings response coef cient (ERC) In constructing our second proxy for pro tability uncertainty, we Appendix B provides more details on the ERC variable. We report in the paper the results from using the ERC1 variable and the results from the ERC2 variable are similar and available upon request. As noted in Pastor et al. (2009) , the ERC measure is ideal to separate uncertainty from volatility because ERC is high when uncertainty is high and when earnings volatility is low. When realized earnings are more precise, 15 We also decide not to use some other uncertainty proxies in the literature. Baker and Wurgler (2006) provide some proxies for hard-to-value stocks. Besides the variables we mention above, they mention that non-dividend-paying stocks are harder to value than dividend-paying stocks because the value of a rm with stable dividends is less subjective. As a result, dividend-paying rms possibly have lower uncertainty and thus may be related to lower incentives. We do see a consistent negative association between the dividend-paying indicator and PPS in our regressions. An alternative explanation of the negative association is that rms with cash constraints (such as non-dividend-paying companies) might prefer restricted stock and options over cash compensation. As a result, a higher PPS is more likely to be observed among non-dividend payers (Jin (2002) and Yermack (1995) ). We include the dividend-paying indicator as a control variable in all model speci cations.
16 Pastor and Veronesi (2003) also use the negative of the reciprocal of one plus the rm age. Using this measure, we nd similar results.
investors would react more to earnings surprises, leading to a higher value of ERC. The shortcoming of the ERC measure is its measurement error. As a result, we also incorporate other empirical proxies of uncertainty in the analysis.
Market-to-book ratio The third proxy for pro tability uncertainty is the market-to-book ratio, which equals market value of equity plus the book value of debt, divided by total assets. Pastor and Veronesi (2003) show that aging in the life of a rm is accompanied by a decrease in the market-to-book ratio.
According to Korteweg and Polson (2009) , the market-to-book ratio is a proxy for rm growth opportunities, and such opportunities are inherently more dif cult to value than the assets in place. As a result, the market-to-book ratio increases with the uncertainty about rm pro tability. We acknowledge that the market-to-book ratio may capture rm growth and other characteristics in addition to uncertainty. An investigation of the market-to-book ratio may not be a direct test of the impact of uncertainty on incentives. It is thus important to also examine a variety of other uncertainty proxies and see whether all these variables give consistent results. Hence, our results need to be interpreted with this point in mind.
Tangibility The fourth proxy is tangibility. Korteweg and Polson (2009) mention that rms with more tangible assets (property, plant, and equipment) are easier to value and thus are related to lower pro tability uncertainty. We use net property, plant, and equipment scaled by rm total assets to measure tangibility.
Analyst forecast error We also construct an analyst forecast error variable as a proxy of pro tability uncertainty. Based on Bae et al. (2008) and Lang and Lundholm (1996) , for each speci c company in each scal year, we rst obtain the absolute value of the forecast error made by each analyst, where forecast errors are de ned as the difference between the forecast value and the actual value of earnings per share.
We then use the median value of these absolute forecast errors, scaled by the absolute value of the actual EPS. Using the mean value of the absolute forecast errors gives similar results. 17 17 Another widely used measure based on IBES data is analysts' forecast dispersion, which usually proxies for potential disagreement in the market. The difference between forecast dispersion and forecast error is that the latter considers the distance between EPS forecast and actual EPS, while the former considers the distance between EPS forecast and the mean forecast among analysts. The forecast error variable better captures pro tability uncertainty studied in this paper. Consider the situation where two analysts issued the same EPS forecast of $5, and the actual EPS turns out to be $3. Then in this example the forecast error will be 2 (which might result from large uncertainty), but the forecast dispersion is just 0.
The Risk Variable
Similar to the literature that tests the relation between risk and incentives, we include stock return volatility as a measure of risk in our regression analysis. As mentioned earlier, existing theories predict a negative relation between risk and incentives, but the empirical evidence on this aspect is inconclusive. Our paper re-examines this issue empirically, with uncertainty variables being included in the empirical speci cation.
We measure stock return volatility as the standard deviation of daily log (percentage) returns over the past ve years, which is then annualized by multiplying by the square root of 254 (Yermack (1995) and Palia (2001)). We also use the percentage rank of stock dollar return variance (Aggarwal and Samwick (1999 , 2002 ; Garvey and Milbourn (2003); and Jin (2002) ) in the empirical analysis, we obtain essentially the same results.
Control Variables
In the regressions, we include various control variables that could potentially affect the incentives provided by a rm to its managers. These control variables have been used in the empirical literature on the deter- we also include pro tability, the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets, advertising expenses scaled by total assets, a dummy variable that is set to one whenever advertising expenses are missing, rm leverage, and dividend payout indicator. We further control for corporate governance variables, which include the CEO chair indicator and the proportion of inside directors in the board. Manager-level variables, such as log(tenure), the CEO indicator, and the female indicator, are also controlled in the regressions. Finally, year and industry effects are included to capture the time and industrial differences in the level of managerial incentives. The detailed de nitions of all the variables used in the paper are described in Appendix B.
Summary Statistics and Correlations between Variables
Table 1 contains summary statistics of the variables used in the regression analysis. The average (median) dollar-to-dollar measure of PPS is 1.13% (0.22%), suggesting that the average (median) dollar change in the sample executives' stock and option holdings for a one thousand dollar change in rm value is $11.3 ($2.2). The summary statistics on the dollar-to-percentage measure of PPS show that the average (median) dollar change in the executives' stock and option holdings for a 1% change in rm (equity) value is $168.61 ($27.97) thousand. These summary numbers are consistent with those provided in the empirical literature such as Core and Guay (1999) , Palia (2001), and Yermack (1995) . The statistics also imply a positive skewness in PPS, with a few companies having very high incentives.
The average, median, minimum, and maximum age of the sample rms is 26, 20, 1, and 84 years, similar to those reported in Pastor and Veronesi (2003) . The rms in the sample have an average (median) earnings response coef cient of 4.44 (2.88), market-to-book ratio of 2.08 (1.51), tangibility of 0.29 (0.23), and total assets of $6.6 ($1.3) billion. The average analyst forecast error relative to the actual value is about 16%. In addition, the average (median) annual stock return volatility is 44% (39%). Table 2 examines the pairwise correlations between the variables. The two PPS variables have a correlation coef cient of 0.55. The PPS1 variable is negatively correlated with rm age and tangibility, and is positively correlated with the earnings response coef cient (ERC) and the market-to-book ratio. The correlations between PPS2 and rm age are very low; it may be due to the fact that PPS2 is PPS1 times market value of equity, and the negative relation between age and PPS1 is canceled out by the positive relation between age and market value. When we control for rm size in the model, the relation between PPS2 and rm age becomes negative and signi cant.
Table 2 also shows that the uncertainty proxy variables are correlated with each other, with the correlation between rm age and market to book being -0.23 and the correlation between rm age and tangibility around 0.18. This indicates that younger rms tend to be the rms with more growth options and lower tangibility ratios. The table also reveals very low correlations between ERC and volatilities and between ERC and rm size. This suggests that ERC serves an ideal proxy variable that separates uncertainty from volatility and rm size. On the other hand, the percentage return volatilities and the dollar return volatilities have opposite signs in correlations with other variables. This is perhaps due to the fact that the dollar return volatility, which equals percentage return volatility multiplied by rm market value, captures the rm size effect.
Empirical Results
This section uses regression analysis to examine the effect of pro tability uncertainty and risk on incentives. The main empirical model is as follows: P P S ijt = + 1 (U ncertainty proxies) j;t 1 + 2 (Risk) j;t 1 (9) + 3 (F irm characteristics) j;t 1 + 4 (M anagerial characteristics) i;t 1
In the equation, we use i to denote manager, j to denote rm, and t to denote year. The dependent variable is the dollar-to-dollar measure (PPS1) and the dollar-to-percentage measure (PPS2) of pay-performance sensitivities. In the OLS regressions, we control for industry effects using two digit SIC indicator variables.
In the rm-manager pair xed effects regressions, we replace industry effects with rm-manager xed effects in Eq. (9) as the latter absorbs the former. We lag all the explanatory variables by one year to mitigate potential reverse causality issue. We, however, acknowledge that lagging may not fully resolve endogeneity because serial correlations may exist in some explanatory variables. We thus also use the xed effects model in robustness analysis to deal with the endogeneity problem caused by time-invariant unobservable factors.
Main Results
Tables 3 and 4 report the OLS regression results, with Table 3 having PPS1 as the dependent variable and   Table 4 having PPS2. The t-statistics in these regressions are heteroskedasticity robust and are adjusted for clustering within rms. In both tables, Column (1) does not include any of the ve uncertainty variables, Columns (2)-(6) include one of the ve uncertainty variables, and Column (7) include all the ve uncertainty variables.
Positive uncertainty-incentive relation The results in both Tables 3 and 4 show that rm age is negatively related to incentives (Columns (2) and (7)), indicating that younger rms, i.e., rms with higher uncertainty, are associated with greater managerial incentives. Both the earnings response coef cient (ERC) and the market-to-book ratio are positively associated with the incentive variable. The relation between tangibility and PPS is negative, suggesting that rms that have more tangible assets are associated with lower incentives. Firms with greater analyst forecast errors (that might be due to greater uncertainty) are also shown to give higher incentives to executives (although this coef cient is insigni cant in the PPS2 regressions in Table 4 ). All these results indicate a positive relation between pro tability uncertainty and incentives, as predicted by our model. This positive relation is not only statistically signi cant but also economically important. Take Table 3 Column (7) and Table 4 Column (7) Re-examine the risk-incentive relation Controlling for pro tability uncertainty can help reveal the negative risk-incentive relation, a key prediction from standard agency theories but with mixed empirical support from existing literature. From the point of view of this paper, the risk proxies used in the previous literature, namely stock volatility and rank of dollar return volatility, could be contaminated by pro tability uncertainty. If pro tability uncertainty is positively related to incentives, then it is not surprising that previous research, in which the risk proxy captures both the cash ow risk 2 and the pro tability uncertainty 0 , nds ambiguous risk-incentive relation.
The above reasoning suggests that in revealing the negative risk-incentive relation, it is important to control for uncertainty, as this helps correct for the positive bias potentially caused by omitting relevant variables that are proxies for pro tability uncertainty. Our empirical results offer evidence for this implication. In columns (1) of Tables 3 and 4 , when we do not include the uncertainty proxies, stock return volatility is positively related to incentives. This result, which seems odd based on the standard agency theory, is actually consistent with the ndings in some empirical studies that document a positive relation between volatility and incentives (Prendergast (2002), Core and Guay (1999) , and Conyon and Murphy (2000)).
In columns (7) of Tables 3 and 4 , when we include the uncertainty variables in the regressions, the relation between volatility and incentives changes from signi cantly positive to either insigni cantly positive in the PPS1 regression, or to insigni cantly negative in the PPS2 regression. This pattern generally hold in other speci cations considered in Section 3.2.2 for robustness checks. Although our results do not fully restore the signi cantly negative risk-incentive relation from the data (possibly due to such reasons as endogenous matching between rm risk and CEO's risk appetite, the learning-by-doing effect in Figure 3 Panel D in this paper, etc.), it should be safe to say that separating pro tability uncertainty from cash ow risk is important when empirically examining the negative risk-incentive relation. Our results also indicate that it may be important to separate the effect of pro tability uncertainty from that of risk when studying other corporate variables.
Relation between investment volatility and uncertainty In Table 5 we regress the volatility of quarterly investment-to-capital ratio (quarterly capital expenditure scaled by previous quarter-end net property, plant, and equipment, see Cleary (1999) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) ) on the same explanatory variables as in Eq. (9). Under the "learning-by-doing" mechanism in our model, rms with uncertain long-run pro tability are offering high-power incentives to their managers for more informative signals in guiding their investment policies. One immediate check of this "learning-by-doing" channel, without involving executive incentives, is to investigate whether rms with higher uncertainty indeed have higher investment volatilities. As expected, both the correlations in Table 2 and the regression in Table 5 show that investment volatility is increasing in the uncertainty proxies, which offers support to our mechanism.
Robustness Analysis
This section performs additional analysis to investigate the robustness of our empirical results.
Risk measured as dollar return volatility
In addition to measuring rm risk using the variance of stock percentage returns, we attempt a different measure of rm risk: volatility of stock dollar returns. Following Samwick (1999, 2003) and Jin (2002) , we use the percentage rank of the variance of dollar returns. According to Samwick (1999, 2003) , the use of the percentage ranks deals with potential outliers in the dollar return data and also allows the pay-performance incentives at different points in the distribution of rm risk to be easily compared. 18 The OLS regression results using the rank of dollar return volatility are reported in Panel A of Table 6 . In Column (1), we nd that the rank of dollar return volatility is negative and signi cant. This result is consistent with the ndings in the previous studies that use the rank of dollar return volatility as the measure of rm risk (Aggarwal and Samwick (1999 , 2002 , Garvey and Milbourn (2003) , and Jin (2002)). In Column (2), we include the uncertainty variables in the model. The coef cients of the uncertainty proxy variables have signs that are consistent with our theoretical prediction. Younger and less tangible growth rms and rms with greater analyst forecast errors are associated with higher incentives. In Column (2), the dollar return volatility continues to be negative and signi cant after the uncertainty variables are included in the model. In Columns (3) and (4), the dollar-to-percentage PPS is the dependent variable and we continue to nd that rms with greater uncertainty provide higher incentives to their executives. The effect of the risk variable is positive and signi cant when the uncertainty variables are excluded, but the effect becomes negative (although insigni cant) when the uncertainty variables are introduced to the model. Table 6 , we perform regressions with the dependent variable being WPS and nd that our results remain intact.
Median regressions Samwick (1999, 2003) and Jin (2002) (1) and (2) of both tables).
The dollar-to-percentage PPS regression gives similar results.
Fixed effect regressions
In Panel E of Table 6 , we run the regressions by adding the rm-manager paired xed effects. Fixed effects are to deal with potential endogeneity issues. For example, it is possible that some unobservable managerial attributes (e.g., risk aversions) are correlated with the explanatory variables such as rm age and at the same time are correlated with the dependent variable, PPS. The rm-manager xed effect may also capture time-invariant unobservable factors that potentially affect endogenous matching between the rm and the manager (Graham, et al., 2010) . We can see from Panel E that our main results remain similar. The coef cients on the pro tability uncertainty proxies continue to show a positive relation between pro tability uncertainty and incentives.
Other robustness checks Finally, the tables reported so far examine each top executive's incentives.
In untabulated analysis, we also examine the CEO incentives only, and the average incentives for top executives in each individual company. The results, omitted for brevity, provide the same implications as those reported here. In all, the empirical results that we obtain offer strong support to our theoretical prediction that pro tability uncertainty is positively related to incentives. 19
Conclusion
This paper introduces pro tability uncertainty into an agency model, and investigates the relation between pro tability uncertainty and incentives. Our model predicts a positive uncertainty-incentive relation, in contrast to the negative risk-incentive trade-off obtained in the extant literature. Therefore, it is important to distinguish risk from uncertainty in studying CEO incentives. Using several proxies for pro tability uncertainty, we then empirically test and nd strong support for our theoretical prediction. Our study suggests that the mixed empirical results from testing the risk-incentive trade-off may be attributable to a positive bias caused by the omission of relevant variables that are proxies for pro tability uncertainty. Zabojnik, Jan, 1996, Pay-performance sensitivity and production uncertainty, Economics Letters 53-3, 291-296.
Appendix
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Note that given ; and L 1 , the manager's expected utility is:
If we denote the above expected utility of the manager as U (L 1 ), then its rst-order condition is
and its second-order condition is
The optimal L 1 is determined by the rst-order condition of the manager's optimization problem:
The xed salary is chosen to satisfy the manager's participation constraint:
or, after substituting the expression of L 1 and b U = 1, we have
Proof of Proposition 1. We rst prove that
> 0 holds when the manager is risk neutral (i.e., a = 0). Then the statement in the proposition immediately follows in light of the continuity of the derivative d =d 0 in a. We can view the maximization problem in terms of implemented effort L 1 . If the optimal effort increases with uncertainty 0 :
and if higher effort is linked to higher incentives, which requires
then we obtain our desired result
Below we proceed to show that both Eq. (10) and Eq. (11) hold.
When a = 0; to implement L 1 , the incentive share satis es
Immediately we know that
l > 0, which is just Eq. (11). Now we use supermodularity property to prove
2k .
Taking expectation, we have
Therefore, we can rewrite the principal's objective as (to reduce notation, we use L to denote L 1 ),
Hence, for a = 0, and ignoring the constant terms, we have
where the rst term is the rst period project value, the second term is the effort cost, and the last term is the second period value. It suf ces to show that
The rst two terms are irrelevant. For the last term, notice that (treating (1 + L) 2 as a single variable)
which is increasing in 0 . Thus,
> 0. Therefore, we have proven
> 0, and hence
> 0 for a = 0. Invoking conitnuity argument, we conclude that our result holds when a is suf ciently small.
Appendix B: De nition of Variables Firm Level Variables
Firm age: Based on Pastor and Veronesi (2003), we consider each rm as "born" in the year of its rst appearance in the CRSP database. Speci cally, we look for the rst occurrence of a valid stock price on CRSP, as well as the rst occurrence of a valid market value in the CRSP / COMPUSTAT database, and take the earlier of the two. The rm's plain age is assigned the value of one in the year in which the rm is born and increases by one in each subsequent year. We use natural log of rm's plain age as the proxy for uncertainty.
Earnings response coef cient (ERC): This variable is the ERC1 as de ned in Pastor, et al. (2009) and is equal to the average of the rm's previous 12 stock price reactions to quarterly earnings surprises. Speci cally, we rst obtain RC, which is the abnormal return due to a quarterly earnings announcement divided by the unexpected quarterly earnings. The abnormal return is measured as the cumulative return of stock i in excess of stock i's industry's return starting one trading day before the rm's earnings announcement and ending one trading day after the same announcement. Quarterly earnings announcement dates are from IBES. The industry returns are the daily returns of 49 value-weighted industry portfolios from Ken French's website. The unexpected quarterly earnings are equal to the difference between the actual quarterly earnings per share (obtained from the IBES unadjusted actuals le) and the mean of all analyst forecasts of EPS using IBES's last preannouncement set of forecasts for the given scal quater, de ated by book equity per share of the company. We winsorize RC at 5% and 95% and average the winsorized quarterly RCs over the rolling three year window to obtain ERC1. Pastor et al. (2009) contain more detailed information on constructing the ERC variables.
Market to book: (Market value of equity plus the book value of debt)/total assets = (CSHO PRCC_F + AT -CEQ)/AT = (data25 data199+data6-data60)/data6. Tangibility: Net property, plant, and equipment/total assets = PPENT/AT = data8/data6. Analyst forecast error: For each individual company in each scal year, we rst obtain the absolute value of the forecast error (equal to the difference between the forecast and the actual EPS values) made by each analyst, and then we use the median value of these absolute forecast errors scaled by the absolute value of the actual EPS. Using the mean value of the absolute forecast errors or scaling by stock price per share gives similar results. The analyst forecast error variable is constructed from the I/B/E/S details database.
Stock return volatility: First obtain the standard deviation of daily log returns over the past ve years, and then annualize the standard deviation by multiplying by the square root of 254. This is the percentage return volatility.
Rank of dollar return volatility: Dollar return volatility is equal to stock percentage return volatility multiplied by the beginning-of-year rm market value. This variable is measured in $millions. Consistent with Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and Jin (2002) , we employ the percentage ranks of dollar return variance in our tests and these percentage ranks range from 0 (lowest risk) to 100 (highest risk).
Investment volatility: This variable is the standard deviation of rm investment over the past 20 quarters, where rm investment is I t =K t 1 , that is, it is equal to capital expenditure in each quarter scaled by previous quarter-end net property, plant, and equipment (PPENTQ).
Firm size: Natural log of total assets = log(AT) = log(data6). Assets are measured in $millions.
Pro tability: Operating income before depreciation and amortization/total assets = OIBDP/AT = data13/data6.
Capital expenditure: Capital expenditures/total assets = CAPX/AT = data128/data6. Advertisement: Advertising expense/total assets = XAD/AT = data45/data6. This variable is set to zero if it is missing and an advertisement missing indicator is thus included in the regressions to deal with the missing advertisement issue. Advertisement missing indicator: A dummy variable equal to one if the advertisement variable is missing.
Leverage: (Long term debt + debt in current liabilities)/total assets = (DLTT+DLC)/AT = (data9+data34)/data6. Dividend-paying indicator: A dummy variable equal to one if dividends on common stock (data21 or DVC) are strictly positive, and zero otherwise. CEO chair indicator: A dummy variable equal to one if the CEO of the company is also the board chairman, and zero otherwise.
Fraction of inside directors: Number of inside board directors divided by board size, where an inside director is de ned as a director who is current or former rm managers or their family members.
Manager Level Variables
PPS1: Dollar-to-dollar measure of pay-performance sensitivity. This variable measures the dollar change in stock and option holdings for a one dollar change in rm value. To estimate PPS1, rst calculate a variable named totaldelta, which is obtained from multiplying the Black-Scholes hedge ratio by the shares in options owned by the executive, and then adding the shares in stock owned by the executive. PPS1 in year t is equal to an executive's totaldelta over scal year t divided by total number of shares outstanding (Compustat data item CSHO) of the company at the beginning of year t. The construction of totaldelta involves lots of details (e.g., how to construct Black-Scholes hedge ratio, how to deal with previously granted options, what to assume for expected life on the options, etc.), and we follow Appendix B in Edmans, et al. (2009) in estimating the totaldelta variable. In the regressions, PPS1 is in percentages.
PPS2: Dollar-to-percentage measure of pay-performance sensitivity. This variable measures the dollar change in stock and option holdings for a one percent change in rm value. PPS2 in year t is equal to PPS1 in year t share price at the beginning of scal year t total number of shares outstanding at the beginning of t / 100, where share price is Compustat data item PRCC_F and total number of shares outstanding is Compustat data item CSHO. In the regressions, PPS2 is in $thousands.
PPS2: Dollar-to-percentage measure of pay-performance sensitivity. It measures the dollar change in stock and option holdings for a one percent change in rm value. This measure is equal to PPS1 share price total number of shares outstanding/100. In the regressions, PPS2 is in $thousands.
WPS: This is the scaled wealth-performance sensitivity proposed in Edmans et al. (2009) and is available from Alex Edmans' website. Speci cally, this sensitivity measure equals the dollar change in executive wealth for a 100 percentage point change in rm value, divided by annual ow compensation (TDC1). This incentive measure is a variant of the percentage-to-percentage incentives used in Murphy (1985) , Gibbons and Murphy (1992), and Rosen (1992) , and replaces ow compensation in the numerator of the measure in Murphy (1985) with the change in the executives' wealth. By considering the change in wealth, the scaled wealth-performance sensitivity captures the important incentives from changes in the value of previously granted stock and options. See Edmans et al. (2009) for details.
Log(tenure): Natural log of the number of years the manager has been with the company, which equals the difference between the year of the observation and the year when the individual joined the company.
CEO indicator: A dummy variable that equals one if the manager is the CEO in a particular year and zero if the manager is a non-CEO top executive. This dummy variable is time variant for a given individual because a speci c manager could be a CEO in some years and a non-CEO in other years.
Female indicator: A dummy variable that equals one if the manager is a female and zero otherwise. 
Table 3 Effects of Profitability Uncertainty and Risk on Incentives (PPS1)
The table presents the OLS regression results on the effects of profitability uncertainty and risk on incentives. The dependent variable is the dollar-to-dollar measure (PPS1) of pay-performance sensitivity. All the explanatory variables are lagged by one year. The sample includes all the companies in ExecuComp and covers the period from 1992 to 2008. The detailed definitions of all the variables are in Appendix B. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics adjusting for clustering within companies are in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***.
Dependent variable = PPS1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Profitability uncertainty variables Edmans et al. (2009) . Panel C contains median regression results. Panel D is median regressions with the volatility variable being dollar return volatility. Panel E is firm-manager paired fixed effect regression results, in which there is one fixed effect for each unique firm-manager combination. Unless mentioned, the return volatility is percentage return volatility. The dependent variable is the dollar-to-dollar measure (PPS1) of pay-performance sensitivity in Columns (1) and (2), and is the dollar-to-percentage measure (PPS2) in Columns (3) and (4). In Panel B, the values of WPS for each individual executive are available from Alex Edmans' website. Specifically, WPS is equal to the change in ln(executive wealth) divided by the change in ln(firm value). This measure is also equal to PPS2 divided by TDC1, where TDC1 is the total compensation of an executive. In the regressions, WPS is winsorized at 99% to deal with outliers. All the specifications include the same control variables as those in Table 3 , but to save space, the coefficient estimates on these control variables are not reported. All the explanatory variables are lagged by one year. The sample includes all the companies in ExecuComp and covers the period from 1992 to 2008. The detailed definitions of all the variables are in Appendix B. For median regressions, t-statistics derived from the bootstrapped standard errors (based on 20 replications) are in parentheses. For OLS (firm-manager fixed effect) regressions, heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics adjusting for clustering within companies (firm-manager pairs) are in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***. 
